UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)		
)		
v.)	CR. No	. 09-32-01 S
)		
MARCUS DENSON.)		
)		

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REDUCTION IN SENTENCE

WILLIAM E. SMITH, United States District Judge.

Defendant Marcus Denson has filed a letter dated November 7, 2011, which the Court treats as a Motion (ECF No. 49). He seeks a reduction in his sentence based on the retroactive application of Amendment 750 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. A review of the record indicates that Denson is ineligible for a reduction in sentence pursuant to Amendment 750 because he was sentenced as a career offender, not pursuant to any guideline which has subsequently been lowered. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); U.S.S.G. § 181.10 cmt. n.1.

"[A] sentencing court has no authority to entertain a sentence reduction motion under section 3582(c)(2) when the guideline amendment in question does not affect the guideline sentencing range actually used by the sentencing court." <u>United States v. Diaz</u>, CR No. 99-091-ML, 2011 WL 2551734, at *2 (D.R.I. June 27, 2011) (quoting United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6,

11 (1st Cir. 2008)); cf. United States v. Cardosa, 606 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2010)("If a defendant not designated a career offender was sentenced under the crack cocaine guidelines before the guideline reduction, he may seek resentencing; if sentenced as a career offender for the same offense, he may not as his sentence was not based on the crack cocaine guidelines."). Here, Denson was sentenced as a career offender and, therefore, is not eligible for resentencing.

Denson claims that the Court determined his sentence of 120 months "based on the fact that [he] did not qualify as a Career Offender." (Mot. 1.) He is mistaken. The Court noted several that Denson qualified for designation as a career offender. (Sentencing Tr. 4, Dec. 2, 2009 (stating that "we're dealing both with a crack cocaine issue and we're dealing with a career-offender-driven guideline range"); Tr. 14-15 (noting that career offender Denson qualified as а because \circ f his distribution charges); Tr. 25 (stating, before pronouncing sentence, that "Mr. Denson, you're designated as a career offender, as you know."); Tr. 27 (again noting that Denson was designated as a career offender and stating that "the guideline range here is driven mostly, as you know, by your criminal history and your designation as a career offender").) Denson's sentence was "based on" his career offender status,

despite the fact that the Court ultimately varied from the career offender sentencing guideline range of 188-235 months.
The fact that a number of possible sentencing ranges were discussed as a frame of reference or benchmark, (Tr. 4-6), does not alter the fact that Denson was sentenced as a career offender, see United States v. Roa-Medina, 607 F.3d 255, 260 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Other courts have held, and we agree, that a district court's reference to offense levels in making its discretionary decision of how far to depart [does] not amount to the application of a sentencing range authorized and made applicable by the Sentencing Guidelines and therefore [is] of no legal significance to the analysis under § 3582(c)(2).") (alterations in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Despite the downward variance, Denson's sentence was based on a range derived from the career offender guideline range.

<u>United States v. Ayala-Pizarro</u>, 551 F.3d 84, 85 (1st Cir. 2008)

("Here, as in Caraballo, the drug type was alluded to in the

¹ The Court gave two reasons for finding that the career offender guideline range was "too harsh" in this case: first, "because of the so-called crack/powder disparity, that is, if this case were charged as a powder cocaine case, it would have a lower guideline range;" and, second, because, while Denson did qualify as a career offender, he was "not on the worst end of that scale." (Sentencing Tr. 27, Dec. 2, 2009.) The Court also stated that it "want[ed] to give [Denson] one more chance." (Id.)

course of constructing the defendant's sentence but, ultimately, the sentence actually imposed was based on a sentencing range derived from the career offender guideline."). Thus, Amendment 750 did not lower Denson's actual sentencing range, <u>Caraballo</u>, 552 F.3d at 11, and he is, therefore, ineligible for a reduction in sentence pursuant to § 3582(c).

For these reasons, Denson's Motion for reduction of sentence is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Is William E. Smith

William E. Smith
United States District Judge
Date: May 10, 2013